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I.  Introduction 
 
In recent years environmental policy makers have shown a preference for cap and 
trade programs over taxes to bring about reduced levels of pollution.  The success of the 
cap and trade program for SO2 emissions under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
explains part of this shift in policy preferences.
1  But part of the preference for cap and 
trade programs has undoubtedly resulted from a general distaste in Washington for new 
taxes.  Policy makers and environmental advocates have argued that cap and trade 
programs avoid the political stigma suffered by taxes and are more likely to be enacted 
by Congress.  The Bush Administration's Clear Skies proposal, for example, relies on a 
cap and trade system to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury 
from electric utility generators.
2   
Offsetting the political advantages of cap and trade programs relative to taxes are 
some practical advantages of environmental taxes.  First, pollution taxes provide a 
measure of certainty to regulated firms.  A carbon tax of $20 per metric ton of carbon, for 
example, ensures firms subject to the tax that they will pay no more than $20 per ton to 
emit carbon.  A cap and trade program has no such assurance.  The price paid for 
emissions under a cap and trade program depends on the market price of permits, a price 
that could fluctuate depending on economic conditions.  Permit prices, according to a 
EPA website ranged from roughly $130 per metric ton to around $220 in 2003.
3   
Second, pollution taxes raise revenue for the federal budget while cap and trade 
programs - so far - do not.  These revenues could help finance some of the tax reform 
initiatives currently under discussion by President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform (Gleckman (2005)).  While nothing precludes the federal government from 
                                                 
1 Ellerman et al. (2000) provides an overview of the SO2 trading program. 
2 See the discussion of cap and trade programs in Chapter 9 of Council of Economic Advisors (2004). G. Metcalf    page 2 
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selling emissions permits, the custom established under the Clean Air Act SO2 and NOx 
trading programs is to give the permits to firms in the regulated industries.  In theory, tax 
based solutions and permit trading solutions can reach the same social optimum in the 
absence of uncertainty over marginal benefit and costs of abatement. But since tax 
revenue generated by Pigouvian taxes can be used to offset reductions from other 
sources, fundamental tax reform proposals could, in theory, be improved under some 
conditions if environmental taxes were included in the mix.
4  
  The United States collects little in the way of revenue from environmental charges 
(including taxes) and the little that is collected is done so in an inefficient manner.
5  
Considering environmental taxes at all levels (federal, state, and local), environmental 
taxes in the United States comprised 3.3 percent of total tax revenues in 2001.
6 By 
contrast, OECD countries as a whole collected 4.9 percent of taxes through 
environmental taxes.  Denmark's environmental tax share, for example, was 10 percent in 
2002; Germany's was 7.1 percent; the United Kingdom's was 7.5 percent.  No country's 
environmental tax share in 2001 was lower than the United States' share. 
  Moreover, there is good evidence that existing levels of environmental taxation in 
the United States fall well short of their optimal levels.  Parry and Small (forthcoming) 
note that the average level of taxation of gasoline in the United States is roughly $.40 per 
gallon while the optimal rate (taking into account pollution and congestion effects) is 
$1.01 per gallon.  While there is widespread agreement that carbon emissions are 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See the EPA's website http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/so2market/alprices.html. 
4 Cap and trade programs in which permits are handed out for free are equivalent to tax programs in which 
the tax revenues are rebated lump-sum (see Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) for a discussion of this point).  
Green tax reforms in which the environmental revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes rather than 
returned lump sum in general have lower welfare costs (see, for example, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996)).  
This is an example of what Goulder (1995) calls a "weak double-dividend." 
5  See Fullerton (1996) for an overview of environmental tax policy and the high costs of collection.  
Francis (1999) notes the decreased use of some environmental taxes in the 1990s. G. Metcalf    page 3 
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environmentally detrimental, estimates of social marginal damages are imprecise.  An 
IPCC literature review by Pearce et al. (1996) found estimates ranging from $5 to $125 
per metric ton of carbon with most estimates below $25 per metric ton.  For discount 
rates between 3 and 5 percent, Tol (1999) found more precise estimates in the range of $9 
to $23 per metric ton.  Below I show that a carbon at the upper end of Tol's range would 
finance complete corporate tax integration. 
In this paper, I identify the impact on industry of implementing a carbon tax to 
pay for full or partial corporate tax integration.  I begin with a discussion of corporate tax 
reform and the link to a carbon tax.  I then discuss my modeling approach and provide 
industry level impacts of a tax reform where a carbon tax finances corporate tax 
integration.  In the conclusion, I consider various possible extensions to this study. 
II.  Background 
 
  The idea of a carbon tax combined with a reduction in existing taxes has been 
extensively studied.  See, for example, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) who consider cuts 
in the personal income tax financed by a carbon tax.   The focus on a carbon tax is a 
natural one given that carbon emissions are mandated in the Kyoto Protocol to be reduced 
in the United States by 7 percent from 1990 levels in the years 2008-2012
7.   While the 
United States has declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, policy makers continue to discuss 
possible policy responses to rising greenhouse gas emissions. 
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in 1990 totaled 1,347 million metric tons of 
carbon and increased to 1,601 million metric tons in 2003, according to the most recent 
                                                                                                                                                 
6   The source for these and subsequent tax share numbers is the OECD Economic Instruments Database. 
7 The Kyoto Protocol actually mandates reductions in six "greenhouse gases:" carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.  Carbon dioxide is by far 
the most significant of the six gases and I limit discussion to this gas.  The text of the Kyoto Protocol along 
with explanatory documents can be found at http://www.unfccc.de.   
 G. Metcalf    page 4 
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report on greenhouse gas emissions from the Energy Information Administration (2004).  
While CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP have tended to fall in the 1990s, emissions are 
19 percent above 1990 levels and 27 percent above the target for emissions set in the 
Protocol.  Thus a substantial effort would be required if the U.S. were to attempt to meet 
the target.   
A carbon tax is an obvious policy tool to help achieve the goals set forth in the 
target.  A natural question is what to do with the carbon tax revenue.  Research by a 
number of economists has indicated that reducing the tax on capital income financed by 
environmental tax revenues would provide the greatest efficiency gains relative to other 
uses of the tax revenue.
8  Corporate tax integration is a way to reduce the tax on capital 
income. 
  Corporate tax integration is an effort to subject all income to a single income tax.  
The United States, like many countries, has a personal income tax and a corporate income 
tax and treats these two taxes as separate and distinct.  Thus, income earned in the 
corporate sector can be subject to a tax first through the corporate income tax and then 
through the personal income tax.  Such a system leads to a number of tax induced 
behaviors which can have significant efficiency impacts: 
 
·  Payout Behavior: the corporate income tax affects the decision to pay out after-tax 
profits in the form of dividends or to retain earnings within the corporation. 
·  Financing Behavior: the corporate income tax influences the decision to finance 
new investments with equity or debt. 
·  Corporate Organization: the corporate income tax affects the decision to organize 
businesses as corporations or partnerships. 
 
                                                 
8 Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) cite a number of studies in their Table 4 that conduct a welfare assessment 
of environmental tax reforms.  Most of the studies use revenues to cut the personal income tax but one 
study using the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model uses revenues to cut capital income taxes.  The welfare gains in 
the studies cited are highest for this policy reform.  This is consistent with findings of Ballard et al. (1985b) 
and others that the marginal welfare cost of capital income taxes are higher than for personal income taxes. G. Metcalf    page 5 
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A 1992 Treasury study on tax integration estimated annual efficiency losses from the 
current tax system (relative to an integrated system) ranging from $2.5 to $25 billion (in 
1991 dollars). 
Table 1 below provides some insight for these distortions.  It shows the amount of 
tax paid on a dollar of earnings from an investment for different financing, 
organizational, and payout assumptions given tax rates in effect in 2005.  
 
Table 1.  Tax Rates on Marginal Profits 
  General Tax Rate  Current Tax Rate 
Corporate Dividends  tc + (1-tc)td  44.8% 
Corporate Interest  ti  35.0% 
Corporate Retained Earnings  tc + (1-tc)tg  37.6% 
Non-Corporate Payouts  ti  35.0% 
 
The second column gives the general formula for the total amount of taxes paid on a 
dollar of pre-tax profits.  There are four relevant tax rates: the corporate rate (tc), the 
personal tax rate on dividends (td), or interest income (ti), and the accrual equivalent tax 
rate on capital gains (tg)
9.  To give a sense of the differences in taxation, I provide 
numerical results using a tax rate of 35 percent for the corporate tax and tax on interest 
income, 15 percent for the personal tax, and 5 percent for capital gains. 
The table illustrates the various distortions.  First, there is a bias against paying 
out dividends.  Profits paid out as dividends are taxed at a rate of nearly 45 percent while 
retained earnings (leading to capital gains) are only taxed at 37.6 percent.   Second, there 
is a bias against equity financing: a dollar of profits paid out in dividends incurs roughly 
1 1/4 times the level of taxes on income paid out as interest.  Third, there is a bias against 
                                                 
9   This simplifies the analysis somewhat as I ignore various complicating factors including the alternative 
minimum tax, as well as the tax treatment of foreigners and tax exempt organizations.  The accrual 
equivalent tax rate on capital gains accounts for the fact that capital gains are only taxed upon realization.  
Moreover, basis step-up at death further reduces the effective tax on capital gains. G. Metcalf    page 6 
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the corporate organizational form. Corporate profits are taxed more heavily than non-
corporate profits
10. 
 According to McLure (1979), interest in integrating the corporate and personal 
income tax systems increased in the 1960s and early 1970s for three reasons.  First, there 
was widespread concern about the low rate of capital formation and it was thought that 
reducing the taxation of dividend income might encourage increased investment.  
Second, a number of European countries provided some form of dividend tax relief.  
Finally, a Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation report in 1967 argued that complete 
integration might in fact be feasible and not simply a conceptual idea. 
Interest in tax integration was overshadowed in the 1980s by broad based income 
tax reform that culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  Rather than 
fundamentally changing the tax system, TRA86 engaged in base broadening and rate 
lowering and the top marginal tax rate on personal income fell from 50 to 28 percent 
while the top corporate tax rate fell from 46 to 34 percent. 
Let us next turn to the mechanics of tax integration.  I'll look at two proposals in 
particular
11.  First, I'll consider full integration where corporate income is allocated to 
individual shareholders and subject to tax at the personal level.  Second, I'll consider 
dividend tax exclusion at the personal level
12.   
                                                 
10 With these numbers, the bias goes away if all corporate after-tax profits are retained. 
11 This section draws in part on an excellent analysis of tax integration written by the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury (1992) (also summarized in  Hubbard (1993)). 
12 McLure (1979) argues against this scheme and proposes instead a dividend deduction at the corporate 
level (similar to the interest deduction).  The advantage of McLure's approach is that corporate income is 
taxed at the shareholder's tax rate rather than the corporate tax rate.  It also eliminates the distortion 
between debt and equity financing (if basis adjustment for dividends paid is made).   The 1992 Treasury 
report considered but rejected this approach on the grounds of cost and implementability. G. Metcalf    page 7 
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1.  Shareholder Allocation Prototype 
 
The Shareholder Allocation Prototype (SAP) comes close to a "pass-through" 
(complete) integration plan that achieves all the goals of a textbook integration of the two 
income taxes.  The SAP approach retains a corporate income tax but passes all corporate 
income, taxes, and credits through to shareholders.  In effect, the corporate income tax 
serves as a withholding tax.  
In brief, the SAP preserves the corporate income tax as a "withholding" tax and 
allocates corporate income and taxes to shareholders.  To see how the SAP works, 
consider the following simple example.  A corporation has $100 of taxable income, pays 
$35 in corporate taxes, and has $65 in after-tax profits which it can either distribute to 
shareholders (as a dividend) or keep as retained earnings.  The purpose of the SAP is to 
tax the shareholder on the $100 of taxable income at the shareholder's tax rate rather than 
to tax income distributed as dividends or retained (and thus leading to capital gains).  
Let's assume for the moment that the entire $65 of after-tax profits is paid out as a 
dividend.  The first important characteristic of the SAP is that dividend income is not 
taxable at the personal level (since the goal of the SAP is to tax corporate income, not 
corporate distributions).  Rather than taxing dividend income, the SAP subjects the entire 
$100 of corporate income to taxation at the personal level.  Just as a worker receives a W-
2 form from an employer detailing wages paid and taxes withheld, a shareholder would 
receive a "corporate W-2" detailing income earned and taxes withheld.  In this example, 
the shareholder would report $100 of taxable income on his personal income tax and 
receive a tax credit for the $35 of taxes paid at the corporate level.  For a taxpayer in the 
40 percent personal income tax bracket, the gross tax liability on the corporate income is 
$40 and the net tax liability (net of corporate tax payments) is $5.  The shareholder has G. Metcalf    page 8 
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$60 in after-tax income available for consumption or saving – the $65 dividend less the 
$5 personal tax liability.  His corporate income has been subjected to a 40% tax. 
Next, assume that the corporation retains the entire $65 in after-tax profits.  Under 
the assumption that equity markets are efficient, the retention of $65 should increase 
share value by $65.  Assuming efficient markets, the shareholder's income has gone up 
by $65 (the increase in value of the shares).  As in the case of distributed profits, the 
shareholder pays a tax on the $100 of corporate income and receives a tax credit for the 
$35 in taxes paid at the corporate level.  In addition, the cost basis for the stock is 
increased by the amount of retained earnings so that no tax liability will be incurred on 
the capital gains due to these retained earnings.   
To see how this works, imagine the shareholder bought one share of stock in this 
corporation on Monday for $1,000.  On Tuesday, the corporation earns $100 per share 
and pays taxes of $35 per share and retains $65.  In an efficient market, the value of the 
stock will increase from $1,000 to $1,065.  On Wednesday, the shareholder sells his share 
for $1,065.  His selling price for purposes of calculating taxable capital gains is $1,065.  
His cost basis, however, is increased from $1,000 to $1,065 since $65 has been added to 
retained earnings.  Thus, the taxable capital gain is $1,065 – 1,065 = $0.  The shareholder 
has received $65 in capital gains upon sale and is subject to a net personal income tax 
liability of $5 (as in the dividend case above) and so has $60 in after-tax income.  The 
corporate income again has been subjected to a tax of 40 percent
13. 
                                                 
13   A simpler approach would be to simply eliminate the tax on capital gains at the personal level.  There 
are a number of problems with this approach.  For example, imagine that Bill Gates suddenly announces a 
special licensing arrangement with Apple Computer and, as a result, the value of Apple Computer stock 
increases by 15 percent.  These capital gains are income that will not be subject to tax at the corporate or 
personal level if capital gains are no longer taxed at the personal level.  Thus, the basis adjustment 
described in the text is a preferable method of handling retained earnings under the SAP. G. Metcalf    page 9 
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 Table 2 shows the marginal tax on a dollar of profits under the SAP.  It shows 
that the various distortions discussed above are eliminated under the SAP. 
 
Table 2.  Tax Rates on Marginal Profits Under SAP 
  General Tax Rate  Current Tax Rate 
Corporate Dividends  tp  35.0% 
Corporate Interest  tp  35.0% 
Corporate Retained Earnings  tp  35.0% 
Non-Corporate Payouts  tp  35.0% 
 
 
The shareholder allocation plan is considerably more complicated to administer 
than the dividend exclusion plan discussed below.  Reporting and auditing burdens for 
corporations are likely to be significant.  For example, the Treasury plan would not pass 
through corporate losses to shareholders but rather carry them forward at the corporate 
level.  This is in keeping with general tax policy.  In addition, change of stock ownership 
during a year complicates allocation of income and taxes to individuals.  Since taxable 
income and tax liabilities are only measured once during the year, allocating income and 
share basis to shareholders must be done on a retrospective basis (and could in fact 
require taxpayers to file amended returns).   
The 1992 Treasury study estimated that a fully phased in SAP would cost $36.8 
billion annually at 1991 income levels. This estimate has three major components.  First, 
corporate income is taxed at the top personal tax rate rather than the corporate tax rate.  
Before any other adjustments, this costs $33 billion in lost tax revenue.  Second, the 
change in basis reduces taxes of capital gains due to retained earnings.  I make a rough 
estimate $11.2 billion in lost tax revenue as a result of this change.  Finally, tax 
integration is likely to lead to a shift from debt to equity finance as the tax disadvantage 
towards equity finance is reduced.  An economic analysis in the 1992 Treasury report G. Metcalf    page 10 
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estimates that corporate leverage falls somewhere between 1 and 7% when there is lump 
sum replacement of the lost tax revenues.  The shift from debt to equity finance reduces 
interest deductions on the corporate income tax and so raises revenue to offset some of 
the loss on the personal tax side.  I estimate this raises about $7.4 billion in taxes.  
Combining these three components yields the $36.8 billion 1991 revenue loss.  Applying 
this methodology to 2003 data, I obtain a rough estimate of the annual revenue loss from 
adoption of the SAP of $36.7 billion at 2003 income levels. 
The complexity of the SAP as well as the revenue loss entailed suggests that a 
more modest and simple integration approach might be more appropriate.  Thus, I next 
consider the dividend exclusion approach. 
  2.  Dividend Exclusion Prototype 
 
The Dividend Exclusion Prototype (DEP) is a simpler form of corporate tax 
integration that achieves partial integration of the two income taxes.  Specifically, it 
excludes dividend income from taxation at the personal level.  Thus, corporate profits 
paid out in dividends are only subject to the corporate income tax. The major advantage 
of the DEP is its simplicity and ease of implementation.  Its simplicity led the Department 
of the Treasury to prefer this approach to any form of dividend imputation credit scheme 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992)).   
Table 3 shows the marginal tax on a dollar of profits under the DEP. Given the 
convergence of the top corporate and personal income tax rates in 2003, the DEP comes 
close to full integration of the tax system. G. Metcalf    page 11 
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Table 3.  Tax Rates on Marginal Profits Under DEP 
  General Tax Rate  Current Tax Rate 
Corporate Dividends  tc  35.0% 
Corporate Interest  tp  35.0% 
Corporate Retained Earnings  tc + (1-tc)tg  37.6% 
Non-Corporate Payouts  tp  35.0% 
 
  Let us now turn to an estimate of the revenue loss under the DEP.  As a rough 
guide to the revenue cost of excluding dividends from taxable income in the personal 
income tax, I can use an estimate of the average marginal income tax rate on dividend 
income constructed from the NBER's TAXSIM tax calculator (Feenberg (2000)).  This 
average tax rate in 2003, the year in which I do my analysis, was 17.6 percent and an 
estimate of reported dividends in 2003 is $104.6 billion.
14   
  Excluding dividends from taxable income would lead to a revenue loss of $18.4 
billion for that year (.176x$104.6).  A few adjustments to this calculation are required to 
obtain a more accurate measure.  First, as noted above, tax integration is likely to lead to 
a shift from debt to equity finance as the tax disadvantage towards equity finance is 
reduced.  Second, there are a number of smaller changes including a reallocation of 
physical capital from the household, non-corporate and state/local government sectors to 
the corporate sector, as well as changes in the equilibrium interest rate and dividend 
payout rates.  Taking these considerations into account, I estimate that the revenue loss 
falls to $23.0 billion per year. 
I will consider the following two DEP proposals: 
 
1)  exclusion of all dividends from personal income tax financed by a carbon tax.  
Based on the calculation above, this would require a carbon tax of $23 billion per 
year. 
 
                                                 
14 Dividends reported on the personal income tax are not available for 2003.  I grossed up reported 
dividends from 2002 by the growth in dividends in NIPA from 2002 to 2003.   G. Metcalf    page 12 
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  It is worth pausing to consider which industries benefit the most from tax 
integration.  There are no data available on distribution of corporate equity holdings by 
industry across equity owners.  I will assume that households hold equities by industry in 
proportion to dividend payouts by industry.  Table 4 below shows the top 10 industries in 
terms of net corporate dividend payments.  These ten industries account for over half of 
dividend payments in 2003 and are likely to be the greatest beneficiaries of tax 
integration. 
   
  Conversely, I can identify those industries that are impacted most heavily by a 
carbon tax.  Given the significant impact on these industries, I consider a second policy 
option: 
2)  exclusion of 100% of dividends from personal income tax from industries most 
heavily affected by a carbon tax combined with 50 percent exclusion for all other 
industries. 
 
III.  Modeling Approach and Analysis 
 
  A number of economists have studied the economic consequences arising from 
corporate tax integration.  The most common approach is to utilize a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model.  Such models have been used by Ballard et al. (1985a), 
Fullerton et al. (1981) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) to analyze the impact 
Table 4.  Top 10 Corporate Dividend Paying Industries 
Industry  $billions 
Management of companies and enterprises  37.9 
Retail trade  32.9 
Construction  22.3 
Chemical products  22.2 
Wholesale trade  21.7 
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and 
technical services  17.2 
Food and beverage and tobacco products  13.5 
Broadcasting and telecommunications  13.0 
Utilities  11.4 
Ambulatory health care services  9.9 
Source: NIPA Data for 2003   G. Metcalf    page 13 
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of corporate tax integration.  CGE models are typically large, complex structural models 
of an economy derived from fundamental economic theory.  Their strengths are their 
logical consistency as well as their usefulness for policy and counterfactual analysis.  
Their very complexity, however, makes them difficult to evaluate from the outside and 
often deeply embedded assumptions and modeling approaches play an important role in 
driving results in ways that are not obvious to the casual observer. 
  Rather than employ a CGE model, I undertake an analysis that utilizes behavioral 
response estimates from CGE modeling as well as other empirical analyses.  I focus on 
three major changes: shifts in the allocation of capital, changes in the sources of funding 
for capital projects, and changes in uses of funds from capital projects. 
The first critical behavioral response arising from corporate tax integration is a 
shift in the allocation of capital.  Integrating the corporate and personal income tax will 
reduce the effective tax rate on corporate capital.  This in turn leads to a shift in capital 
from the non-corporate to the corporate sector.  In particular, capital flows from the 
household, government, and non-corporate sector to the corporate sector.  This will lead 
to an increase in corporate taxes and a decrease in personal taxes as taxable profits shift 
from the non-corporate sector (as well as the nontaxable sectors) to  the corporate sector.   
The second critical behavioral response is a change in corporate leverage 
structure.  Corporate tax integration removes (or reduces) the advantage to debt financing 
(relative to equity financing).   Thus I expect less debt financing and more equity 
financing.  I calculate the change based on empirical estimates of the impact of taxes on 
financing structure from Graham (1999).  Shifts from debt to equity financing affect tax 
collections in three ways: 1) they reduce corporate interest deductions and so increase 
corporate tax collections, 2) they reduce interest income taxable at the personal level, and G. Metcalf    page 14 
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3), they increase retained earnings (to the extent that equity related profits are retained 
rather than distributed.  These retained earnings will be taxed at the personal level upon 
realization of the capital gains associated with the earnings.   
The third critical behavioral response is a change in dividend payout behavior.  
Chetty and Saez (2004) document that corporations responded to the decrease in dividend 
taxation in 2003 by increasing dividend payouts both by existing firms and by firms that 
hitherto had not paid dividends.   It will turn out changes in dividend payout behavior 
have little impact on the revenue estimates.  After tax integration, payout behavior only 
affects tax collections to the extent that capital gains are taxed.  As discussed below, on 
an accrual basis, capital gains are taxed quite lightly and so changes in their tax treatment 
have only a minimal impact on tax collections. 
Shareholder Allocation Prototype 
 
  I begin with an analysis of the Shareholder Allocation Prototype (SAP).  As noted 
above, the SAP treats corporate income in a similar fashion to partnership income.  The 
corporate income tax continues to operate in its present fashion but it should now be 
properly viewed as a withholding tax.  Corporate income and corporate tax payments are 
attributed to individual shareholders who report the income on the personal income tax 
and take credits for any taxes paid at the corporate level. 
  I first note the assumptions that I make about the three types of behavioral 
changes I expect after tax reform.  First, there is the shift in capital from the non-
corporate to the corporate sector.  Based on the analysis in the Treasury study, I would 
predict a shift in capital (as a fraction to total capital) towards the corporate sector of 2.8 
percentage points  (see column 3 in table).  As Table 5 below demonstrates, this implies 
an increase in corporate capital of 10.8 percent (column 4). G. Metcalf    page 15 
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Table 5.  Capital Stock Distribution 












Corporate  9,032  26.0%  2.8%  10.8% 
Non-corporate  4,217  12.2%  -0.3%  -2.5% 
Government  6,493  18.7%  -0.1%  -0.5% 
Household  14,951  43.1%  -2.4%  -5.6% 
Total  34,693  100%     
Source: NIPA and Authors' calculations 
 
  What impact this shift will have on taxable income in the corporate sector is 
unclear.  One thought might be that taxable profits increase at the same rate as does the 
capital stock (assuming constant returns to scale in production and a scaling up of all 
other inputs in production at the same rate as capital).  This overstates the growth in 
taxable profits for two reasons.  First, a  change in relative prices (decrease in cost of 
capital) will lead to an increase in the use of the favored factor greater than any increase 
in other factors.  On this basis alone, the growth in output would be likely to be 
something on the order of 1/4 to 1/3 the growth in capital.  Second, this view ignores the 
impact of the decline in the housing sector on production in the economy.   Demand for 
durable goods, construction, and other industry outputs would fall as capital shifts out of 
residential housing.  Because of these two considerations, I do the following.  First, I 
report detailed industry impacts assuming no change in corporate and non-corporate 
output.  Then, I show how the aggregate revenue estimates are affected by changes in 
corporate and non-corporate output.  The distribution across sectors of price changes is 
not appreciably affected by changes in output and so our understanding of the relative 
industry impacts is not affected. 
  The second behavioral response is a change in the source of funds for corporate 
investment.  To calculate this change, I use results from Graham (1999).  Graham G. Metcalf    page 16 
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regresses the debt to value ratio on a number of variables including the tax preference for 
debt variable,  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( e c p P t t t - - - - = , where tp is the tax rate on interest income, tc 
is the corporate tax rate and te is the tax rate on equity.  The estimated change in the debt 
to value ratio will be b(P1-P0) where b is the estimated coefficient on the debt tax 
preference variable in Graham's regression, and P1-P0 is the change in the value of this 
variable following tax integration. 
The tax rate on equity is a weighted average of the tax rate on dividend income 
and the accrual equivalent tax rate on capital gains (weighted by the dividend payout 
ratio).  Following Graham (1999), Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990), and Feldstein et al. 
(1983), I reduce the statutory rate on capital gains by 75 percent to convert to an accrual 
equivalent.  This is a conventional assumption based on half the taxes being foregone 
through deferral and half again from basis step-up at death.  I assume an accrual 
equivalent tax rate on capital gains of 5 percent.
15   The pre-tax reform tax on equity 
equals (.62)(.176) + (.38)(.05) = .128 where the dividend payout ratio for 2003 was 62 
percent and the average marginal tax on dividends is 17.6 percent.  Thus the debt 
preference variable (P0) equals 8.31 percent.  The Shareholder Allocation Prototype 
drives the tax preference variable to zero (P1 = 0).  Based on Graham's preferred 
regression and coefficient estimate of 0.070, this reduces the leverage ratio by .58 
percentage points. 
  Finally, I assume a 4.3 percent increase in the dividend payout ratio based on the 
1992 Treasury study.  It turns out that this parameter has little impact on the results.  
Since dividends are no longer taxed at the personal level and the accrual equivalent tax 
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rate on capital gains is only 5 percent, the change in tax collections is minor relative to 
other changes. 
  I begin by reporting summary results on aggregate changes in taxation resulting 
from the SAP. 
Table 6.  SAP Revenue Losses ($billions) 
  Change in   
  Corporate Tax  Personal Tax  Total 
Domestic  2.1  -33.2  -31.0 
Rest of the World  0.0  -5.7  -5.7 
Total  2.1  -38.9  -36.7 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
The row labeled "Rest of the World" represents tax revenues on earnings from foreign 
corporations owned by domestic taxpayers.  The SAP loses $5.7 billion in personal 
income taxes that do not benefit owners of domestic firms.   See Appendix Table A1 for a 
detailed breakdown of the revenue losses. 
  I next turn to the analysis of carbon taxes and the overall impact of the tax reform 
on industry prices.   To finance corporate tax integration, I impose a carbon tax designed 
to raise $36.7 billion in 2003.  Carbon emissions that would be potentially subject to a 
carbon tax totaled 1,574.3 million metric tons of carbon in 2003 (Energy Information 
Administration (2004)).  Assuming no change in emissions, a carbon tax of $23.31 per 
metric ton of carbon would be necessary to raise $36.7 billion.  Carbon emissions break 
down as follows: 
 
Table 7.  Carbon Emissions in 2003 
Fuel Source  Emissions (mmtc)  Fraction of Total  Revenue ($bill) 
Coal  571.3  36.3%  $13.3 
Natural Gas  321.6  20.4%  $7.5 
Petroleum  681.4  43.3%  $15.9 
Total  1574.3  100.0%  $36.7 
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  I now have all the information to determine the direct impact of the tax reform.  
All I need to do is offset the tax reductions in Appendix Table 1 with tax increases of 
$13.3 billion for the coal mining industry and $23.4 billion for the oil and gas extraction 
industries.   This approach, however, ignores the indirect impacts of the taxes as prices 
change in the economy.  I turn to that analysis now. 
  The conventional view of the incidence of carbon taxes is that they will be passed 
forward in the form of higher product prices to consumers.  The input-output analysis 
makes that assumption and translates the intermediate goods taxes into higher industry 
prices as energy intensive inputs (now more expensive) are used in the production of 
downstream goods.  Corporate tax integration, by reducing the double taxation of capital 
income should increase the income of owners of all capital (corporate and non-
corporate).   This result was first shown by Harberger (1962) and this incidence 
assumption is frequently used (see, for example, Pechman (1985)). It is possible that in 
the context of a package reform where corporate tax integration is combined with a 
carbon tax, the entire package of taxes is passed forward in changes in prices of industry 
products.  This follows as the higher prices of goods (due to the carbon tax) put domestic 
goods at a competitive disadvantage relative to imported goods.  This competitive force 
makes it difficult for owners of capital to appropriate the gains from corporate tax 
reductions.   
  If this argument is correct, then the price changes I report below can be viewed as 
a measure of the industry incidence impact of the tax reform.  Alternatively, it may be 
that the conventional story continues to hold and that the carbon tax is passed forward 
into higher prices while the corporate tax integration tax reductions accrue to owners of 
capital (are passed backward).  Rather than attempt to determine the ultimate incidence of  G. Metcalf    page 19 
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this complex reform, I take a different tack.  I report a statistic that I call the Breakeven 
Incidence Share (BIS).  The BIS represents what fraction of the carbon tax must be 
shifted back to shareholders to offset the gains from corporate tax integration.  For 
example, if an industry experiences a price increase of 4 percent due to the carbon tax 
and the equivalent of a 0.4 percent decrease due to corporate tax integration, then the BIS 
is 10 percent.  In other words, so long as no more than 10 percent of the carbon tax is 
shifted back to capital owners, the benefits of corporate tax integration exceed the costs 
of the carbon tax from the perspective of capital owners. 
  First I show the price impacts resulting from corporate tax integration.  As noted 
above, these are the price impacts under the assumption that the tax reductions are passed 
forward to consumers.  I are not arguing that this in fact will happen; this allows us to 
present the tax changes in a way that allows comparison with the carbon tax price 
changes.   G. Metcalf    page 20 
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Table 8. Price Changes Due to SAP 
Greatest Declines in Price Due to SAP 
Industry  Price 
Change 
Management of companies and 
enterprises  -2.42% 
Petroleum and coal products  -1.10% 
Chemical products  -0.96% 
Food and beverage and tobacco 
products  -0.86% 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products  -0.73% 
Smallest Declines in Price Due to SAP 
Industry  Price 
Change 
Computer systems design and related 
services  -0.18% 
Government  -0.18% 
Warehousing and storage  -0.19% 
Information and data processing 
services  -0.19% 
Legal services  -0.20% 
 
Not surprisingly, three of the five industries with the greatest price declines are included 
in the list of top corporate dividend paying industries (Table 4).  Interestingly, the 
Petroleum and Coal Products industry, which I would expect to be heavily impacted by 
the carbon tax, benefits disproportionately from corporate tax integration.  The dispersion 
of price changes is moderate and in all cases negative.  The price changes arising from 
the SAP are of a comparable magnitude to the dispersion of price changes due to the 
carbon tax (except for three industries) as the next table shows: G. Metcalf    page 21 
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Table 9. Price Changes Due to Carbon Tax 
Greatest Increases in Price Due to Carbon 
Tax 
Industry  Price 
Change 
Petroleum and coal products  7.34% 
Coal mining  6.81% 
Utilities  5.08% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  1.77% 
Primary metals  1.46% 
Smallest Increases in Price Due to Carbon 
Tax 
Industry  Price 
Change 
Computer systems design and related 
services  0.06% 
Legal services  0.06% 
Performing arts, spectator sports, 
museums, and related activities  0.08% 
Motion picture and sound recording 
industries  0.09% 
Ambulatory health care services  0.09% 
 
Petroleum refining, coal mining, and utilities suffer very large price increases relative to 
other industries (and relative to the price decreases from SAP).  Combining the two price 
changes, I can see that the rankings are largely driven by the carbon tax increases: G. Metcalf    page 22 
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Table 10. Total Changes in Prices Due to Tax 
Reform 
Greatest Increases in Price  
Industry  Price 
Change 
Coal mining  6.40% 
Petroleum and coal products  6.20% 
Utilities  4.43% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  1.18% 
Primary metals  1.07% 
Greatest Decreases in Price  
Industry  Price 
Change 
Management of companies and 
enterprises  -2.30% 
Retail trade  -0.55% 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products  -0.52% 
Food and beverage and tobacco 
products  -0.51% 
Chemical products  -0.49% 
 
Complete results for all sectors are presented in the appendix.   Of the 58 sectors 
analyzed, only 14 have a positive net price change while 44 have a negative price change.  
Once I get past the top three industries, the price changes range from -2.30 to 1.18 
percent, a relatively moderate range of net price changes. 
  Comparing these two price changes is only appropriate if the reduction in capital 
income taxation is passed forward to consumers in the form of lower prices (or if the 
carbon tax is passed back to capital owners in the form of lower returns).  I next report 
my measure of the required amount of pass-back in the carbon tax possible before equity 
holders are adversely affected by this reform.  I report it for the ten industries with the 
highest net price increase. G. Metcalf    page 23 
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Table 11. Breakeven Incidence Shares 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax  SAP  Sum  BIS 
Coal mining  6.81%  -0.38%  6.40%  6% 
Petroleum and coal products  7.34%  -1.10%  6.20%  15% 
Utilities  5.08%  -0.63%  4.43%  12% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  1.77%  -0.59%  1.18%  33% 
Primary metals  1.46%  -0.38%  1.07%  26% 
Pipeline transportation  1.09%  -0.54%  0.54%  50% 
Air transportation  0.83%  -0.35%  0.48%  42% 
Waste management and remediation 
services  0.76%  -0.46%  0.29%  61% 
Government  0.41%  -0.18%  0.23%  44% 
Truck transportation  0.47%  -0.33%  0.14%  70% 
 
So long as less than 6 percent of the carbon tax is passed back to equity holders in the 
coal mining industry, returns to shareholders will not fall following this green tax 
reform
16.  The column labeled "Sum" provides the consumer price increases under full 
forward passing of both taxes.   
Another way to present the information in the BIS is to report which industries are 
harmed under various amounts of backward shifting of the carbon tax.  The next table 
reports this. 
                                                 
16 This abstracts from any redistribution of returns between corporate and non-corporate capital.  The 
standard Harberger assumption is that the benefits of corporate tax reduction accrue to all owners of capital, 
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Table 12. Backward Shifting of Carbon Tax 
and Impacted Industries 
10 percent shift 
Coal mining 
20 percent shift 
Coal mining, Utilities, Petroleum refining and 
related products 
30 percent shift 
Coal mining, Utilities, Petroleum refining and 
related products, Primary Metal Industries 
40 percent shift 
Coal mining, Utilities, Petroleum refining and 
related products, Primary Metal Industries, 
Other Mining 
50 percent shift 
Coal mining, Utilities, Petroleum refining and 
related products, Primary Metal Industries, 
Other Mining, Air transportation, Government 
 
  Summing up, the SAP financed by a carbon tax blunts to a modest degree the 
price increases that arise from the latter tax.  If the carbon tax is fully passed forward to 
consumers, then the tax reform benefits the owners of equity in nearly all industry 
sectors.  This is worth emphasizing.  The standard incidence view is that a carbon tax 
would be passed forward to consumers in the form of higher product prices while capital 
tax reductions would be passed back to owners of capital.  If this view is correct, business 
(or, more precisely, the equity holders) would generally benefit from corporate tax 
integration financed by a modest carbon tax. 
   The SAP above is estimated to cost nearly $37 billion a year.   That is based on 
no growth in corporate profits (and corporate taxes - other than changes resulting from 
changes in financial policy).  If production were Cobb-Douglas with a capital output 
elasticity of .25, then a 10.8 percent increase in capital would bring about a 2.7 percent 
increase in output.  The decrease in capital use in other sectors would have a spill-over 
effect on the corporate sector as described above.  Rather than try to estimate the growth G. Metcalf    page 25 
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in taxable corporate profits, I present some revenue estimates for different growth 
assumptions
17.   
Table 13. SAP Revenue Estimates  








Change in Total 
Taxes 
0.0%  2.1  -38.9  -36.7 
1.0%  5.0  -39.1  -34.1 
2.0%  7.9  -39.3  -31.4 
3.0%  10.7  -39.5  -28.8 
 
As the growth rate of corporate profits increases, so do corporate income tax collections.  
This is offset by a slight decrease in personal income tax collections as corporate income 
is now taxed at a lower average rate and non-corporate income falls.  Income from the 
non-corporate sector also falls a bit as capital shifts from the non-corporate to the 
corporate sector.     
  The good news is that growth in corporate revenues arising from the shift in 
capital reduces the need for a substantial carbon tax, perhaps by as much as 20 to 25 
percent based on the growth rates in Table 13.  While a carbon tax raising only $30 to 
$35 billion a year would not bring about the reductions in carbon use called for in the 
Kyoto Protocol, a carbon tax of this magnitude would have considerably less of an 
impact on the economy and would allow for learning about the efficiency and 
distributional impacts of a carbon tax if it were decided in the future to increase reliance 
on this tax to effect a substantial reduction in carbon emissions. 
Dividend Exclusion Prototype   
 
  The next analysis that I consider is the dividend exclusion prototype (DEP) 
discussed above.  Put simply, dividends are no longer taxable at the personal level.   My 
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assumptions about financial behavior are the same as in the previous section.  Again, note 
that the pre-tax reform tax on equity equals (.62)(.176) + (.38)(.05) = .128 where the 
dividend payout ratio for 2003 was 62 percent and the average marginal tax on dividends 
is 17.6 percent.  Excluding dividends from taxable income at the personal level reduces 
the tax on equity from 12.8 percent to 1.9 percent and the debt preference variable from 
8.31 percent to 1.24 percent.  Based on Graham's preferred regression, this reduces the 
leverage ratio by 0.49 percentage points. 
  Table 14 presents summary results on the changes in taxation resulting from the 
DEP. 
Table 14.  DEP Revenue Losses ($billions) 
  Change in   
  Corporate Tax  Personal Tax  Total 
Domestic  1.8  -17.9  -16.1 
Rest of the World  0.0  -4.0  -4.0 
Total  1.8  -21.9  -20.1 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
    
  First I show the price impacts resulting from corporate tax integration.  Table 15 
lists the five industries with the lowest price declines and the five with the highest price 
declines (complete results are in Appendix Table A3).  The price changes are relatively 
modest.   
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Table 15. Corporate Tax Integration: DEP 
Industry  DEP 
Least Benefit from Corporate Tax Integration 
Computer and electronic products  -0.06% 
Government  -0.07% 
Warehousing and storage  -0.08% 
Educational services  -0.08% 
Other transportation and support activities  -0.09% 
Greatest Benefit from Corporate Tax Integration 
Management of companies and enterprises  -0.66% 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components  -0.48% 
Chemical products  -0.40% 
Petroleum and coal products  -0.31% 
Paper products  -0.28% 
 
The benefits from corporate tax integration are fairly evenly distributed across industry 
groups.   In contrast, the costs of the carbon tax are highly concentrated as the following 
table shows. 
 
Table 16. Carbon Tax Price Increases 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax 
Highest Price Increases 
Petroleum and coal products  4.02% 
Coal mining  3.62% 
Utilities  2.74% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.95% 
Primary metals  0.78% 
Lowest Price Increases 
Legal services  0.03% 
Computer systems design and related services  0.03% 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related 
activities  0.04% 
Broadcasting and telecommunications  0.05% 
Wholesale trade  0.05% 
 
Three industries face price increases of more than 2.7 percent while the remainder face 
price increases of one percent or less.    G. Metcalf    page 28 
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I next turn to the combined effects of the overall tax reform.  Table 17 shows the 
five industries with the largest gains and losses from the tax reform expressed as a 
percentage change in price. 
 
Table 17. Direct and Indirect Effects of Green Tax Reform 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax 
DEP  Sum 
Highest Price Increases 
Petroleum and coal products  4.02%  -0.31%  3.70% 
Coal mining  3.62%  -0.14%  3.47% 
Utilities  2.74%  -0.22%  2.51% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.95%  -0.27%  0.68% 
Primary metals  0.78%  -0.15%  0.63% 
Highest Price Decreases 
Management of companies and 
enterprises  0.06%  -0.66%  -0.60% 
Electrical equipment, appliances, 
and components  0.16%  -0.48%  -0.32% 
Retail trade  0.06%  -0.22%  -0.16% 
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications  0.05%  -0.19%  -0.14% 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products  0.11%  -0.25%  -0.14% 
 
 
A list of price changes for all industries in included in the appendix.   Of the 58 sectors 
analyzed, 20 pay more in carbon taxes than they receive in tax reductions, 1 is unaffected, 
and 37 benefit from the tax reform.  What is striking, however, is that once I get past the 
top three industries, the price changes are quite modest, not exceeding 1 percent in 
absolute value. 
  I once again report the BIS statistic for the industries with the highest net price 
increase.   G. Metcalf    page 29 
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Table 18. Breakeven Incidence Shares 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax  DEP  Sum  BIS 
Petroleum and coal products  4.02%  -0.31%  3.70%  8% 
Coal mining  3.62%  -0.14%  3.47%  4% 
Utilities  2.74%  -0.22%  2.51%  8% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.95%  -0.27%  0.68%  28% 
Primary metals  0.78%  -0.15%  0.63%  19% 
Pipeline transportation  0.60%  -0.20%  0.40%  33% 
Air transportation  0.45%  -0.10%  0.36%  22% 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.40%  -0.17%  0.23%  43% 
Waste management and remediation 
services  0.41%  -0.24%  0.17%  59% 
Government  0.22%  -0.07%  0.16%  32% 
 
The BIS threshold for the top three industries is lower under the DEP than the SAP plan 
raising the likelihood that equity holders would be adversely affected by the DEP relative 
to the SAP.   
I can reduce the impact on the top three carbon impacted industries somewhat by 
giving preferential dividend exclusion treatment to these industries relative to the 
remaining sectors.  For example, the following table illustrates the price impacts from 
excluding all dividends from personal income taxation for the petroleum refining, coal 
mining, and utility industries while excluding 50 percent of dividends for remaining 
industries. 
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Table 19. Direct and Indirect Effects of Green Tax Reform: 
Preferential Treatment for Heavily Impacted Industries 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax 
DEP  Sum  BIS 
Highest Price Increases 
Petroleum and coal products  1.98%  -0.24%  1.74%  12% 
Coal mining  1.76%  -0.10%  1.66%  6% 
Utilities  1.34%  -0.19%  1.15%  14% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.46%  -0.14%  0.32%  30% 
Primary metals  0.38%  -0.08%  0.30%  21% 
Highest Price Decreases 
Management of companies and 
enterprises  0.03%  -0.34%  -0.31%  * 
Electrical equipment, appliances, 
and components  0.08%  -0.24%  -0.16%  * 
Retail trade  0.03%  -0.11%  -0.08%  * 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products  0.06%  -0.13%  -0.07%  * 
Wood products  0.06%  -0.13%  -0.07%  * 
In the BIS column, an asterix indicates that more than 100% backward shifting of the tax 
would be required for the reform to harm equity owners. 
 
While this preferential treatment reduces the price impact for these three industries (and 
raises the BIS), they still face sharply higher prices relative to other sectors.  Moreover, 
the amount required to be raised by a carbon tax is reduced from $20.1 billion to $9.9 
billion.  The cost of reducing the interindustry impacts is a reduced need for carbon tax 
revenues and impetus for reductions in carbon use. 
  Finally, returning to the first DEP scenario (excluding all dividends from personal 
income taxation), I report alternative revenue estimates assuming different growth rates 
for corporate profits.   
Table 20. DEP Revenue Estimates  








Change in Total 
Taxes 
0.0%  1.8  -21.9  -20.1 
1.0%  4.3  -22.1  -17.9 
2.0%  6.7  -22.3  -15.6 
3.0%  9.2  -22.5  -13.3 
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Tax revenues fall by one-third when corporate profits rise by 3 percent relative to the no 
growth scenario.   
IV.  Conclusion 
 
  The United States lags behind other developed countries in its use of 
environmental taxes as a revenue source.  In this paper I consider how a carbon tax could 
be used to finance reductions in capital income taxation through corporate tax integration.  
I note that a carbon tax used to finance corporate tax integration could have beneficial 
efficiency effects.  Moreover, the industry impacts are likely to be modest (in the sense of 
returns to shareholders).  Put differently, there is little need to provide substantial 
additional relief to particular industry sectors in the economy to hold them harmless in 
the reform.   
  I close with three additional comments about a carbon tax linked to corporate tax 
integration.  First, the revenue required of a carbon tax to offset revenue losses from tax 
integration is relatively modest and the carbon tax would certainly fall short of levels 
required to bring about significant reductions in carbon emissions.  This proposal could 
be viewed as a first step towards a serious carbon policy whereby the U.S. gains 
experience with this new tax before committing to more substantial levels of carbon 
reduction.   
  Second, a carbon tax could lead to a shift away from domestic production of 
carbon intensive commodities towards foreign production and importation of those 
commodities.  Any significant carbon tax would need to address this possibility by 
imposing some sort of levy on the embodied carbon in imported goods.  One simple, 
albeit imperfect, way to do this would be to use domestic input-output tables to estimate G. Metcalf    page 32 
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the carbon content embodied in commodities and apply these estimates to imported 
goods.  Further research on this issue would be useful. 
  Third, my focus in this paper on industry level distribution of taxes is somewhat 
unusual and is of interest more from a political economy perspective than a traditional tax 
incidence perspective.  My focus is dictated by my interest in linking a carbon tax with a 
tax which would increase economic efficiency.  Reductions in capital income taxation are 
generally held to be more efficient than other types of tax reductions.  Corporate tax 
integration has the added benefit of combining reductions in capital income taxation with 
an equalizing of tax treatment across various forms of capital.   This focus on efficiency 
comes at the cost of a likely reduction in overall progressivity in the tax code under this 
proposed reform.  Whether policy makers should emphasize progressivity or efficiency in 
crafting a green tax reform with a carbon tax is beyond the scope of this analysis.  What I 
have argued in this paper, however, is that a carbon tax provides additional flexibility to 
policy makers as they strive to balance the various goals of efficiency, distribution, and 
simplicity in tax administration while addressing growing fiscal budgetary pressures and 
mounting environmental concerns. 
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Appendix A.  Input-Output Analysis 
 
The input-output accounts trace through the production of commodities by 
industries and the use of those commodities by other industries.  Taken together, one can 
trace the use of inputs produced by one industry and used by all other industries.  Various 
adding up identities along with assumptions about production and trade allow the 
accounts to be manipulated to trace through the impact of price changes in one industry 
on the products of all other industries in the economy.  A brief description of the use of 
the input-output accounts follows
18. 
  Tracing price changes through the economy on the basis of input-output accounts 
dates back to work by Leontief (documented in Leontief (1986)).  The model makes a 
number of important assumptions the most important of which are 1) goods are produced 
and sold in a perfectly competitive environment such that all factor price increases are 
passed forward to consumers, 2) domestic and foreign goods are sufficiently different 
that the price of domestic goods can adjust following changes in factor prices
19, and 3) 
input coefficients aij (the amount of industry i used in the production of industry j) are 
constant.  Thus input substitution is not allowed as factor prices change.  This last 
assumption means that price responses are only approximate as they don't allow for 
product mix changes as relative prices change.  In effect, the input-output accounts can be 
used to trace first order price effects through the economy. 
  Two sets of equations define the basic input-output accounts.  The first set relates 
the demand for goods from an industry to the value of output from that industry: 
                                                 
18 This discussion is based on Metcalf (1999). 
19  Fullerton (1996) terms this the Armington assumption following work by Armington (1969). G. Metcalf    page 34 




x11p1 + x12p1 + ... + x1Np1 + d1p1 = x1p1 




xN1pN + xN2pN + ... + xNNpN + dNpN = xNpN 
 
where xij is the quantity of the output from industry i used by industry j, pi is the unit 
price of product i, di is the final demand for output i, and xi is the total output of industry 
i.  These N equations simply say that the value of output from each industry must equal 
the sum of the value of output used by other industries (intermediate inputs) plus final 
demand.  Without loss of generality, I can choose units for each of the goods so that all 
prices equal 1.  This will be convenient as the expenditure data in the input-output 
accounts can then be used to measure quantities prior to any taxes that I will impose. 
  The second set of equations relates the value of all inputs and value added to the 
value of output:  
x11p1 + x21p2 + ... + xN1pN + v1 = x1p1 




x1Np1 + x2Np2 + ... + xNNpN + vN = xNpN 
 
where vi is value added in industry i.  Define aij = xij/xj, the input of product i as a fraction 
of the total output of industry j.  The system (B2) can be rewritten as 
 
(1-a11)p1 - a21p2 - ... - aN1pN = v1/x1 




-a1Np1 - a2Np2 - ... + (1-aNN)pN = vN/xN 
 
These equations can be expressed in matrix notation as 
(B3')  (I - A')PI = V G. Metcalf    page 35 
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where I is an NxN identity matrix, A is an NxN matrix with elements aij, PI is an Nx1 
vector of industry prices, pi, and V is the Nx1 vector whose i
th element is vi/xi.  Assuming 
that (I-A') is non-singular, this system can be solved for the price vector: 
(B4)  PI = (I-A')
-1V. 
 
With the unit convention chosen above, PI will be a vector of ones.  However, I can add 
taxes to the system in which case the price vector will now differ from a vector of ones as 
intermediate goods taxes get transmitted through the system.  Specifically, let tij be a unit 
tax on the use of product i by industry j.  In this case, the value of goods used in 
production (grossed up by their tax) plus value added now equals the value of output: 
 
x11p1(1+t11) + x21p2(1+t21) + ... + xN1pN(1+tN1) + v1 = x1p1 




x1Np1(1+t1N) + x2Np2(1+t2N) + ... + xNNpN(1+tNN) + vN = xNpN 
 
This set of equations can be manipulated in a similar fashion to the equations above to 
solve for the price vector: 
(B6)  PI = (I - B')V 
 
where B is an NxN matrix with elements (1+tij)aij. 
  I regrouped industries in the input-output accounts into 50 industry groupings.  
Tax rates are computed as the ratio of required tax revenue from the industry divided by 
the value of output from that industry.  Imagine that a carbon tax is designed to collect 
$20 billion on coal.  The tax rate applied to the coal industry then equals G. Metcalf    page 36 












where the tax is designed to collect $20 billion from the coal industry (industry 4).  This 
tax is applied to all variables in the fourth equation of B5.  Other industry level taxes are 
computed in a similar fashion.  Some taxes only apply to the output of certain industries 
used by certain other industries.  The treatment of industry 5, crude oil and natural gas, 
provides an example.  The crude oil and natural gas industries are combined into one 
industry by the input-output accounts.  Natural gas, however, is predominantly used by 
the utilities industries (industry 36) while crude oil goes to the petroleum refining 
industry (industry 17).  Thus, I allocate the tax on natural gas to output from the crude oil 
and natural gas industry (industry 5) used by the utilities (industry 36) while the carbon 
tax on petroleum is allocated to the use of industry 5 by the petroleum refining industry 
(industry 17). G. Metcalf    page 37 














Farms  0.008  -0.120  -0.112 
Forestry, fishing, and related activities  0.006  -0.056  -0.049 
Oil and gas extraction  0.003  -0.357  -0.354 
Coal mining  0.001  -0.023  -0.022 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.002  -0.085  -0.083 
Support activities for mining  0.002  -0.051  -0.049 
Utilities  0.036  -1.488  -1.452 
Construction  0.009  -1.920  -1.912 
Food and beverage and tobacco products  0.012  -2.363  -2.352 
Textile mills and textile product mills  0.002  -0.107  -0.105 
Apparel and leather and allied products  0.002  -0.191  -0.190 
Wood products  0.001  -0.187  -0.187 
Paper products  0.005  -0.428  -0.423 
Printing and related support activities  0.005  -0.306  -0.301 
Petroleum and coal products  0.002  -1.486  -1.484 
Chemical products  0.012  -2.188  -2.176 
Plastics and rubber products  0.006  -0.326  -0.321 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.001  -0.296  -0.296 
Primary metals  0.001  -0.085  -0.084 
Fabricated metal products  0.002  -0.719  -0.717 
Machinery  0.002  -0.511  -0.509 
Computer and electronic products  0.003  0.334  0.337 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components  0.001  -0.329  -0.328 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  0.003  -0.189  -0.186 
Other transportation equipment  0.001  -0.419  -0.418 
Furniture and related products  0.001  -0.151  -0.150 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.001  -0.380  -0.379 
Wholesale trade  0.014  -2.950  -2.936 
Retail trade  0.019  -4.566  -4.547 
Air transportation  0.002  -0.110  -0.108 
Rail transportation  0.001  -0.076  -0.075 
Water transportation  0.000  -0.040  -0.040 
Truck transportation  0.004  -0.144  -0.140 
Transit and ground passenger transportation  0.001  -0.019  -0.018 
Pipeline transportation  0.000  -0.053  -0.053 
Other transportation and support activities  0.003  -0.285  -0.282 
Warehousing and storage  0.001  -0.029  -0.028 
Publishing industries (includes software)  0.014  -0.400  -0.386 G. Metcalf    page 38 
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Motion picture and sound recording industries  0.004  -0.039  -0.035 
Broadcasting and telecommunications  0.020  -1.105  -1.085 
Information and data processing services  0.006  -0.004  0.002 
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and 
leasing  1.898  -13.907  -12.009 
Legal services  0.001  -0.220  -0.220 
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and 
technical services  0.001  -1.101  -1.100 
Computer systems design and related services  0.000  -0.145  -0.145 
Management of companies and enterprises  -0.005  -6.819  -6.823 
Administrative and support services  0.005  -0.459  -0.455 
Waste management and remediation services  0.000  -0.113  -0.113 
Educational services  0.001  -0.081  -0.080 
Ambulatory health care services  0.003  -0.820  -0.817 
Hospitals and nursing and residential care 
facilities  0.003  -0.350  -0.347 
Social assistance  0.001  -0.154  -0.153 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and 
related activities  0.003  -0.098  -0.096 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation 
industries  0.003  -0.097  -0.095 
Accommodation  0.004  -0.175  -0.171 
Food services and drinking places  0.011  -0.401  -0.389 
Other services, except government  0.003  -0.301  -0.298 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table A2.  Price Changes from Carbon Tax/SAP Reform 
Industry 
Carbon 
Tax  SAP 
Total 
Taxes  BIS 
Farms  0.52%  -0.39%  0.13%  75% 
Forestry, fishing, and related activities  0.16%  -0.26%  -0.10%  * 
Oil and gas extraction  0.22%  -0.52%  -0.31%  * 
Coal mining  6.81%  -0.38%  6.40%  6% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  1.77%  -0.59%  1.18%  33% 
Support activities for mining  0.44%  -0.63%  -0.20%  * 
Utilities  5.08%  -0.63%  4.43%  12% 
Construction  0.29%  -0.45%  -0.16%  * 
Food and beverage and tobacco products  0.35%  -0.86%  -0.51%  * 
Textile mills and textile product mills  0.43%  -0.65%  -0.22%  * 
Apparel and leather and allied products  0.21%  -0.73%  -0.52%  * 
Wood products  0.22%  -0.51%  -0.29%  * 
Paper products  0.61%  -0.72%  -0.11%  * 
Printing and related support activities  0.25%  -0.67%  -0.42%  * 
Petroleum and coal products  7.34%  -1.10%  6.20%  15% 
Chemical products  0.47%  -0.96%  -0.49%  * 
Plastics and rubber products  0.37%  -0.64%  -0.28%  * 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.74%  -0.66%  0.08%  89% 
Primary metals  1.46%  -0.38%  1.07%  26% 
Fabricated metal products  0.40%  -0.61%  -0.21%  * 
Machinery  0.30%  -0.58%  -0.28%  * 
Computer and electronic products  0.16%  -0.23%  -0.07%  * 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components  0.29%  -0.65%  -0.36%  * 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  0.28%  -0.38%  -0.09%  * 
Other transportation equipment  0.23%  -0.60%  -0.37%  * 
Furniture and related products  0.23%  -0.57%  -0.34%  * 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.23%  -0.63%  -0.40%  * 
Wholesale trade  0.09%  -0.48%  -0.39%  * 
Retail trade  0.12%  -0.66%  -0.55%  * 
Air transportation  0.83%  -0.35%  0.48%  42% 
Rail transportation  0.28%  -0.38%  -0.11%  * 
Water transportation  0.39%  -0.49%  -0.10%  * 
Truck transportation  0.47%  -0.33%  0.14%  70% 
Transit and ground passenger transportation  0.38%  -0.29%  0.09%  76% 
Pipeline transportation  1.09%  -0.54%  0.54%  50% 
Other transportation and support activities  0.29%  -0.40%  -0.12%  * 
Warehousing and storage  0.27%  -0.19%  0.08%  70% 
Publishing industries (includes software)  0.12%  -0.42%  -0.30%  * 
Motion picture and sound recording industries  0.09%  -0.22%  -0.13%  * 
Broadcasting and telecommunications  0.10%  -0.40%  -0.30%  * G. Metcalf    page 40 
    September 29, 2005 
 
 
Information and data processing services  0.10%  -0.19%  -0.09%  * 
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and 
leasing  0.12%  -0.51%  -0.40%  * 
Legal services  0.06%  -0.20%  -0.15%  * 
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and 
technical services  0.11%  -0.32%  -0.21%  * 
Computer systems design and related services  0.06%  -0.18%  -0.12%  * 
Management of companies and enterprises  0.12%  -2.42%  -2.30%  * 
Administrative and support services  0.15%  -0.30%  -0.15%  * 
Waste management and remediation services  0.76%  -0.46%  0.29%  61% 
Educational services  0.11%  -0.24%  -0.13%  * 
Ambulatory health care services  0.09%  -0.30%  -0.21%  * 
Hospitals and nursing and residential care 
facilities  0.16%  -0.30%  -0.14%  * 
Social assistance  0.19%  -0.37%  -0.18%  * 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, 
and related activities  0.08%  -0.27%  -0.20%  * 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation 
industries  0.16%  -0.29%  -0.13%  * 
Accommodation  0.16%  -0.36%  -0.21%  * 
Food services and drinking places  0.24%  -0.38%  -0.14%  * 
Other services, except government  0.16%  -0.27%  -0.11%  * 
Government  0.41%  -0.18%  0.23%  44% 
Source: Author's calculations.  The Breakeven Incidence Share (BIS) reports the maximum fraction of 
carbon tax that can be passed back to equity owners before the returns to shareholders falls.  An asterix 
means that more than 100% backward shifting of the tax would be required for the reform to harm equity 
owners. G. Metcalf    page 41 





Table A3.  Price Changes from Carbon Tax/DEP Reform 
Industry  Carbon 
Tax  DEP  Sum  BIS 
Farms  0.28%  -0.17%  0.12%  61% 
Forestry, fishing, and related activities  0.09%  -0.17%  -0.08%  * 
Oil and gas extraction  0.12%  -0.17%  -0.06%  * 
Coal mining  3.62%  -0.14%  3.47%  4% 
Mining, except coal, oil and gas  0.95%  -0.27%  0.68%  28% 
Support activities for mining  0.24%  -0.21%  0.03%  88% 
Utilities  2.74%  -0.22%  2.51%  8% 
Construction  0.16%  -0.20%  -0.04%  * 
Food and beverage and tobacco products  0.19%  -0.27%  -0.08%  * 
Textile mills and textile product mills  0.23%  -0.23%  0.00%  100% 
Apparel and leather and allied products  0.11%  -0.25%  -0.14%  * 
Wood products  0.12%  -0.25%  -0.13%  * 
Paper products  0.33%  -0.28%  0.05%  85% 
Printing and related support activities  0.13%  -0.23%  -0.10%  * 
Petroleum and coal products  4.02%  -0.31%  3.70%  8% 
Chemical products  0.26%  -0.40%  -0.14%  * 
Plastics and rubber products  0.20%  -0.24%  -0.04%  * 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.40%  -0.17%  0.23%  43% 
Primary metals  0.78%  -0.15%  0.63%  19% 
Fabricated metal products  0.21%  -0.23%  -0.01%  * 
Machinery  0.16%  -0.18%  -0.02%  * 
Computer and electronic products  0.09%  -0.06%  0.03%  67% 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components  0.16%  -0.48%  -0.32%  * 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  0.15%  -0.20%  -0.05%  * 
Other transportation equipment  0.13%  -0.16%  -0.03%  * 
Furniture and related products  0.13%  -0.19%  -0.06%  * 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.12%  -0.26%  -0.14%  * 
Wholesale trade  0.05%  -0.16%  -0.12%  * 
Retail trade  0.06%  -0.22%  -0.16%  * 
Air transportation  0.45%  -0.10%  0.36%  22% 
Rail transportation  0.15%  -0.13%  0.02%  87% 
Water transportation  0.21%  -0.15%  0.07%  71% 
Truck transportation  0.26%  -0.11%  0.14%  42% 
Transit and ground passenger transportation  0.21%  -0.12%  0.08%  57% 
Pipeline transportation  0.60%  -0.20%  0.40%  33% 
Other transportation and support activities  0.16%  -0.09%  0.06%  56% 
Warehousing and storage  0.15%  -0.08%  0.07%  53% 
Publishing industries (includes software)  0.07%  -0.12%  -0.06%  * 
Motion picture and sound recording 
industries  0.05%  -0.09%  -0.04%  * G. Metcalf    page 42 
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Broadcasting and telecommunications  0.05%  -0.19%  -0.14%  * 
Information and data processing services  0.06%  -0.09%  -0.04%  * 
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and 
leasing  0.06%  -0.12%  -0.05%  * 
Legal services  0.03%  -0.11%  -0.08%  * 
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and 
technical services  0.06%  -0.17%  -0.11%  * 
Computer systems design and related 
services  0.03%  -0.10%  -0.07%  * 
Management of companies and enterprises  0.06%  -0.66%  -0.60%  * 
Administrative and support services  0.08%  -0.12%  -0.04%  * 
Waste management and remediation services  0.41%  -0.24%  0.17%  59% 
Educational services  0.06%  -0.08%  -0.02%  * 
Ambulatory health care services  0.05%  -0.14%  -0.09%  * 
Hospitals and nursing and residential care 
facilities  0.09%  -0.10%  -0.01%  * 
Social assistance  0.10%  -0.15%  -0.04%  * 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, 
and related activities  0.04%  -0.17%  -0.13%  * 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation 
industries  0.09%  -0.14%  -0.06%  * 
Accommodation  0.08%  -0.15%  -0.07%  * 
Food services and drinking places  0.13%  -0.14%  -0.01%  * 
Other services, except government  0.09%  -0.11%  -0.02%  * 
Government  0.22%  -0.07%  0.16%  32% 
Source: Author's calculations.  The Breakeven Incidence Share (BIS) reports the maximum fraction of 
carbon tax that can be passed back to equity owners before the returns to shareholders falls.  An asterix 
indicates that more than 100% backward shifting of the tax would be required for the reform to harm 
equity owners. G. Metcalf    page 43 
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